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Information design has entered the mainstream in the past 
decade. No longer the exclusive domain of scientific literature, 
tables, network diagrams, scatter plots, and polar graphs are now 
a routine occurrence on the pages of The New York Times and 
The Washington Post.  The tools for creating such graphics are 
increasingly accessible to the non-specialist. These range from 
“canned” charts in spreadsheet and presentation software, to 
powerful interactive data visualization platforms like Gephi and 
Graphviz, to fully-customizable programming languages and 
language libraries like D3.js, Python’s matplotlib, and Processing. 
And yet, data visualization, conceived as an object of study, has 
been slow to penetrate academic literature, particularly in the 
humanities. A researcher working with quantified visual methods 
may be expected to wield the tools, but will find it a difficult task 
to consult an authoritative history of their usage. The widely 
available series on the display of quantitative information by 
Edward Tufte’s is often recommended in this regard, but con-
stitutes more of a style guide than a book of history or criticism. 
His methodology usually consists of analyzing an ad-hoc corpus 
of illustrations, culled from the annals of space exploration, 
cartography, advertising, newsprint, and propaganda, with the 
purpose of making a normative point related to the best or worst 
practices in the field. My treatment of the Soviet materials in 
this article aspires to make a modest contribution to a particular 
narrative in the history of modern art. The larger ambition is to 
stage a new thematic, influenced by the contemporary practice 
of data visualization. Such an experiment in history making leads 
to a rich archive and to novel explanatory models that avoid some 
of the limitations of traditional historiography. 
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For those not familiar with Tufte’s work, a good place to start is his pamphlet on 
The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint. This short—30 pages or so—work offers an elegant 
argument against certain pernicious data-presentation practices pervasive among 
corporate and government bureaucracies. The problem with PowerPoint, according 
to Tufte, is in its template system. The program encourages sequential, low-density, 
“thin” information, organized in neat bullet points that can be read from far away. This 
method of communication works well for a corporate sales pitch, but is problematic 
when used by NASA engineers, for example, as illustrated in the case of the space 
shuttle Columbia. Tufte argues that in analyzing what seemed to be a relatively minor 
take-off accident, NASA engineers presented their findings in PowerPoint slides (in-
stead of printed technical reports), which served to obscure crucial information that 
could have prevented the disaster. The consequent report by the Columbia Accident 
Investigation board largely agreed with Tufte’s findings, recommending against this 
practice, which it called, derisively, “engineering by PowerPoint.”1
For the historian who finds this type of analysis convincing, Tufte’s work contains 
several important implications. The first is thematic. The Visual Display of Quantitative 
Information and its companion volumes contain a wealth of historical material that does 
not normally find its way into the history books. Tufte does not aim to write a history, 
however. Similar in purpose to William J. Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White’s The Elements 
of Style, VDQI is a manual of sorts. It is a collection of best (and worst) data design 
practices. Where Tufte includes the illustrations to make a normative point, he also 
begins to outline a systematic history of data visualization. Despite the contemporary 
ubiquity of bar graphs, pie charts, scatter plots, and network diagrams, little critical at-
tention is devoted to the phenomenon outside of the data design community. However 
contemporary the figures seem to the reader, Tufte’s compendium shows a glimpse 
of a vast and still-unexamined historical archive. The scholarship of Johanna Drucker, 
Ian Hacking, Lev Manovich, and Warren Sack, among other select few researchers, 
has breached the subject. But the output remains largely theoretical. Jacques Bertin’s 
Semiology of Graphics is the closest thing we have to a comprehensive synchronic 
treatment of diagrams, networks, and maps. Seminal diachronic work is absent for 
even the basic figures.
“Critical understanding of visual knowledge remains oddly underdeveloped,” Jo-
hanna Drucker wrote in a 2010 article on what she calls “graphesis,” defined as “the field 
of knowledge production embodied in visual expression.” She blames the marginaliza-
tion of graphesis on the “logocentric and empirical” biases of academic epistemology.2 
More than a bias, I would argue that information design resists easy categorization by 
definition. Not quite art because often too ugly, too mundane, or too instrumental, and 
not quite science because sometimes imprecise or downright misleading, it exists on 
the margins of history of art and history of science, in business schools and marketing 
programs, in the departments of art and architecture, computer science, and statistics. 
Data visualization is not only categorized as an ambiguous artifact, it is ontologically so. 
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that which is known, disrupting established epistemic regimes.
As part of that dynamic, the Soviet materials favored by Tufte illustrate what I am 
calling here the “thin data” problem. Tufte’s publications abound with Soviet-era docu-
ments. One reason for this is the abundance of Soviet and even early Soviet specimens. 
The Soviets were early innovators in the field of data design, producing work that still 
elicits emulation in the twenty-first century. At the same time, Tufte frequently uses 
Stalin-era graphics as examples of worst practices in data design, full unnecessary 
“chart junk” that carries no meaning and high on the “lie factor” scale. For example, 
the Cognitive Style of PowerPoint begins with a table comparing the median number 
of entries in data matrices for statistical graphics in various publications. On top of that 
table is the journal Science with more than a thousand data points per table. Nature 
and The New York Times follow closely behind with 700 and 120 average data points 
per table respectively. PowerPoint slides are at the bottom of that list, with 12 data 
points, followed only by the Soviet daily Pravda, with average data density of five.3 
At once pervasive and empty of content, Soviet graphics often have the shape of data 
design, but without the data. I will argue here that such paucity of information is typi-
cal of many Soviet documents from the interwar period (roughly, the 1930s), which, 
as we will see, was a formative period that heralded the emergence of a new and now 
universally-recognized aesthetic.
Take, as a starting reference point, the poster in Figure 1 by Pavel Sokolov-Skalia 
from 1939.
Fig. 1. Pavel Sokolov-Skalia, “From Sta-
tion Socialism to Station Communism,” 
1939. Image in the public domain. 
Photograph by the author.▲
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Socialism to Station Communism and under the “experienced guidance of Engineer 
Stalin.” The railroad metaphor is reinforced by the timetable awkwardly labeled “The 
Completed Movement of the Bolshevik Train.” The train schedule should, we expect, 
illustrate the Marxist chronology of political development: time going along the verti-
cal axis and the various “-isms” playing the part of station names along the horizontal. 
But the Soviet Union did not follow the prescribed path of Marxist progress, nor could 
the state planners ever agree on (or, perhaps, risk committing to) an actual timetable 
of communist economic development. In the era of purges, an artist could ill-afford 
errors in ideological judgment. Sokolov-Skalia solved the problem by labeling the 
initial stations of the “train schedule” after revolutionary newspapers. These, unlike 
“socialism” or “communism,” could at least be dated to a specific point in time. The 
schedule has the train departing station Iskra in 1900, arrive at Dekabr’ at 1905, move 
on to Pravda at 1912, and pass through “station” Octiabr’ at 1917. 
Things begin to get stranger at “station” Socialism, which repeats twice on the 
chart. The plateau in the middle of the graphic suggests some vague notion of “now,” 
whereas “station” Communism extends beyond the boundaries of the table, in the 
distant future, at a different scale and also without specific temporal coordinates. The 
graphic keeps some of the conventions of a time plot, violating many others. Note, for 
example: the mixing of time and “station names” on the y-axis, the illusion of variable 
slope, and the skewed column of cells in center—distorted by the redundant label 
mid-vector. It would be easy to dismiss this mess as the work of a scientifically illiter-
ate hack or as mere propaganda. But the solutions are also quite ingenious. Katerina 
Clark puts it well when she writes that “Stalinist intellectuals were the adepts and 
encoders [...] expected to divine the essence of both Marxist-Leninist ideology and 
the current Party platform and present it in coherent, if often allegorical form.”4 In 
this light, the distorted timetable of the revolutionary locomotive is a creative attempt 
to order inherently messy ideological information using the advanced (for the time) 
tools of then incipient data science.
Propaganda posters in this period were made to introduce the sciences of order 
and organization to the public. These compound, multi-modal images asked people 
to keep up with schedules, to fulfill quotas, and to understand projected figures. The 
designers responsible for that message faced a particular challenge. Their graphics 
borrowed from the visual vocabulary of development economics. But they were forced 
to use that vocabulary under the conditions of numerical inexactitude, in a country 
where statistical figures were often distorted for political reasons.5 We see then a cu-
rious dynamic develop between scientific and artistic modes of discourse, by which 
certain formal attributes of industrial planning and quantitative data design were co-
opted into purely stylistic principles of visual composition. Unattached to any notion 
of underlying reality in the extreme case, the aesthetics of thin data are devoid of all 
but compositional meaning. That Soviet statistics lie is not in itself a surprising finding. 
What warrants attention is a common morphology of ordering structures, which extend 
across boundaries and between discrete domains of cultural activity.
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Art history often ignores visual space. By this I mean actual visual space, as in “im-
ages commonly encountered everywhere,” and not just on museum walls or in private 
studios. In the Soviet case, the story told about visual art usually progresses through 
a series of -isms: from futurism, to constructivism, faktura, suprematism, to social 
realism—all movements of much theorizing and manifesto-making. For example, in 
the excellent and widely cited monograph The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, 
Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond, the discussion moves from Malevich directly to 
Stalin’s “aestetico-political coup” which heralded the death of avant-garde and the birth 
of socialist realism.6 Catrina Clark’s recent book, subtitled Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, 
and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, unpacks the 1930s much more carefully, but con-
tains no mention of data design or information graphics. Data, however anachronistic 
of a term, is nowhere in the critical vocabulary. Subsequently, the artifacts of data 
visualization remain invisible to the analysis.
The terms of traditional art history fail to capture the specificity of the image in the 
first of our “close readings.” Sokolov-Skalia’s poster is neither abstract, nor avant-garde, 
nor realist in  any sense of the word. Yet, the visual style is clearly recognizable as part of 
an aesthetic emerging in the interwar period. What are its identifiable characteristics? 
Take the poster in Figure 2, for example, by Gustav Klutsis, from 1931.
▲
Fig. 2. Gustav Klutsis, “Kom-
somol, to a record crop,” 
1931, and the same rotated 
90ºW. Image in the public do-
main. Wikimedia Commons.
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montage: the juxtaposition of photographic images.7 An unexpected feature of the 
composition emerges when we turn the image on its side. The rotors of the combine 
resemble a bar graph, which makes sense together with a slogan compelling Communist 
youth to a record crop. Viewed vertically, the composition is cinematic, but meaning-
less: the combine is getting closer. Viewed horizontally, the composition acquires an 
econometric meaning: the crop is increasing with time. 
The technique is representative of Klutsis’s “middle” period, between constructiv-
ism and realism (after the intersecting planes and before the happy children).8 The 
critical literature sometimes refers to this style a “factography,” defined by the primacy 
of the camera as a technology of seeing without mediation. In describing the period, 
Benjamin Buchloh, a prominent art historian of the period, writes that “faktura, an 
essential feature of the modernist paradigm that underlay the production of the Soviet 
avant-garde until 1923, was replaced by a new concern for the factographic capacity of 
the photograph, supposedly rendering aspects of reality visible without interference,” 
exchanging the  “indexical materiality of the trace of a verifiable process, tactility of the 
construction of incoherent surfaces and spatial reference” for “the monumentally of the 
camera-angle’s awesome visions and the technological media optimism it conveys.”9 And 
yet “montage” or “monumental propaganda” (as critical constructs) are insufficient to 
fully capture the recognizable visual specificity of the 1930s. With the state’s new-found 
emphasis on economic and industrial development, Klutsis and his colleagues begin to 
integrate numerical data into their design practice. These early info-graphics juxtapose 
not just images (as in the photo-montage of the 1920s) but narrative and quantitative 
information, creating multi-modal collages that layer pictures, words, and numbers.
In the Soviet context, the aesthetics of quantified information are further refracted 
by the necessity of creating persuasive graphics under the conditions of thin data. New 
sight lines and new perspectives were initially enabled by optical innovation in film 
and photography. But in a later development, they unfold along the pathways of data 
design, as a function of data projection. The favored (and often repeated) image at the 
background of many graphics from the period is the crooked pipeline of an industrial 
factory, which resembles the line plot of upward progress. In a 1931 industrial poster by 
A. Lubimov (Figure 3), for example, we observe a compound synecdoche in which in-
dustrial infrastructure and abstract motivational goals of the five-year plan become one.
The device makes literal what Klutsis calls “art that stands on the level of socialist 
industry.”10 At first glance, the image is representational. Factory employees, busy 
at their stations, urge their fellow workers not to delay production: “shock-work,” 
working hard and long hours, will insure the timely delivery of “equipment for new 
construction.” A more careful look at the composition, from farther afield, reveals the 
relation between the seemingly meaningless (although topically relevant) elements. 
The pipe leading up to the tall silo bends sharply to imitate the saw-tooth curve of the 
rising line graph. The silos reinforce the upward trend as bar charts. The workers too 
inhabit an empty quantified field: they stand in various poses in front of what looks 
like window panes or graph paper. A cord connects each workstation to a beam in the 
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ceiling, forming yet another series of blank small multiples11 against the background. 
The designs by Klutsis from this period are often much more explicit in this regard, 
overlaying literal graphs on top of drawings, figures, and photographs. 
Stalin’s own reports, presented at the party plenum every few years or so, exhibit 
much the same shift from flat, dense narrative reports to stylized data visualization. His 
Political Report of the Central Committee to the 16th Congress of the C. P. S. U. (B) in 
1930 contains an analysis of the country’s economic situation, complete with the ac-
▲
Fig. 3. A. Lubimov, “With shock-labor we will ensure prompt delivery,” 1931. Image in the 
public domain. Wikimedia Commons.
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the qualitative assessment of the given economic indicator, followed by quantitative 
support. The data is sparse, with the numbers appearing in-line with the text of the 
speech—just as we saw in print a decade earlier. The data is there, but it is weakly 
structured, and often simply interspersed within the narrative. The 1934 report to the 
17th Plenum differs strikingly in appearance (Figure 4).
▲
Fig. 4. Illustrations from Stalin’s report to the 17th Party Plenum in 1934. Published by Partiz-
dat, pages 14–16.
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and diagrams. The tables are pretty thin, containing on average 15 to 25 entries. By 
contrast to the earlier reports, the pamphlets of the mid ’30s are intended for a mass 
audience: the text is set in large font, accompanied by brightly colored, full-page 
graphics. These graphs make use of the same cliches (almost verbatim!) we have 
encountered in the posters: silos, pipes, combines, line graphs, trains, and numbers. 
Multi-modality and thin quantification in just such a mix of numerically symbolic and 
graphically representational figures is in fact the defining feature of graphic design 
from the period. The tremendous print runs (in the millions) of such documents and 
the enforced nature of their distribution practically insured the rapid formation of a 
new national aesthetic.
Projection
However invisible in the history books, I believe these specimens to be overwhelm-
ingly representative of the visual space of the period. More than representative, my 
initial findings suggest the complete saturation of the urban public visual space with 
exactly such images.
To test my historical intuitions in this regard, I took a three-month random sample 
from the highest-circulation Russian daily newspaper for the years of 1915, 1925, and 
1935.12 In going through the newspaper archive, I counted the frequency with which 
structured data design13 appeared in each issue (Figure 5).
▲
Fig. 5. A comparison of Russian 
and Soviet daily newspapers 1915, 
1925, 1935. A composite image by 
the author. 
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Russkoe Slovo, I counted 42 instances of structured data design, with 23 of these be-
ing little more than regular geographic maps with some overlaid information (usually 
related to troop movement). The newspaper’s rather sizable advertising section (which 
often took the front page) contributed an additional 48 instances, mostly in the form of 
bank statements, shareholder reports, and lottery proceedings. These most often took 
the form of simple charts. In the period between April 1 and June 30th of 1925, the 
Soviet Pravda appealed to data graphics 44 times, again mostly in the form of simple, 
low-density tables. An additional 10 instances can be attributed to the then greatly-
diminished advertising section.
In 1935, the newspaper landscape looks drastically different. Over 266 tables, 
charts, diagrams, and compound maps clutter the six pages of the daily edition: that 
is, roughly five instances per issue and a little under one instance per page. The news-
paper published a daily metallurgy report and detailed weekly status reports from the 
agricultural sector. About once a month the whole front page of the paper was given 
to such statistics. Something happened between the 1920s and the 1930s to cause a 
dramatic shift (by an order of magnitude) in the nation’s data design practices. The 
newspaper—what used to be narrative-driven medium—has become significantly more 
visual and more quantitative.14
This change was by no means limited to newspaper print. It must be seen in the 
context of wider social transformation. In an article published in the January 1931 is-
sue of a trade journal for artists, For Proletariat Art (Za proletarskoe iskustvo), Polina 
Babina identifies eight challenges that stood before the State Graphic Art Publishing 
House (Izogiz). The first of these was the radical particularization of state propaganda. 
Babina writes, “If in times past, the poster called for the fulfillment of the five-year 
plan in four years in a very general way, today it must call for the fulfillment of specific 
goals in the struggle for the five-year plan. The poster must be saturated with specific 
material.”15 Specificity, in this case, meant a transition from motivational, slogan-driven 
signage to images that articulated exact numerical goals, in a mode borrowed from the 
science of planning and economics, filled with figures and statistics.
Alongside this transition, the party was faced with the very practical problem of 
conveying this relatively sophisticated message to an illiterate population. In the 1920s, 
Bolsheviks organized propaganda trains and even propaganda boats, whose main task 
was to garner support for the struggling Bolshevik movement in the remote regions of 
the state. By the 1930s the future of the Bolsheviks was no longer in peril, but the party 
still had considerable difficulty in convincing the population to adopt some of its more 
unpopular economic policies (like collectivization). For these aims, the spread of literacy 
was closely connected with ideological indoctrination. Government offices, factories, 
and collective farms had special programs for the liquidation of illiteracy (likbez) and 
space was allocated for these purposes.16 Posters and pamphlets on display in these “red 
corners” were easy to read. They served as teaching aids and propaganda, plastered 
on the street corners, office walls, museums, in metro stations and in kindergartens.
The principle vehicles of the new aesthetic were posters, reports, pamphlets, book 
design, and sten-gazeta (large-scale newsprint that was literally pasted on the wall)—
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such multimedia. During the 15th anniversary of the October revolution in 1932, for 
example, lights were made to project figures and slogans into the sky. A screen with 
an area of 45,000 square feet was used to display slides that highlighted the economic 
achievements of domestic agriculture. Main squares and major streets of the capital 
were thematically decorated with giant banners. One of these, placed over the cen-
tral shopping center (TSUM) had the length of 370 feet. The organizers of the event 
commissioned artists to decorate empty shop windows. Over 150 such displays were 
created. The main focus of the event, as decreed by the event’s central organizing com-
mittee, was the accomplishments of the Soviet industry.17 But the shops themselves 
were empty. The first five-year plan, as we know, was a response to to an economic 
crisis.18 Hypothetical, projected figures and charts in the shop windows covered the 
lack of supplies within, and so the city itself was transformed into a thin infographic 
and empty quantification.
As the party prepared its cadres, it also centralized its political message. In March 
of 1931, the Central Committee published a decree in Pravda, entitled Regarding 
Poster Literature. The directive unified all mass poster production under the umbrella 
of Izogiz.19 By the mid-1930s the number of approved posters decreased from thou-
sands to dozens. While Izogiz approved only ten to 12 designs each year, it increased 
the print runs of each from tens of thousands to millions.20 In practical terms, the 
bureaucratic consolidation of the medium normalized the message. Workers, farmers, 
and city dwellers saw the same images and read the same slogans whether they lived 
in Moscow or Vladivostok.
Presentation
“The cadres decide everything!” proclaimed Stalin’s image from the face of a widely 
circulated poster designed by Klutsis.21 The word cadre itself, which is related to the 
Latin quadrum, underscores the party’s preoccupation not just with order, but the 
figure of order. In the case of the Soviet Union at least, the normalization of data and 
bureaucracy congeals simultaneously, as part of the same process. Tufte captures this 
dynamic in a captioned photograph on on the cover of his Cognitive Style of Power-
Point pamphlet. The image shows a (real) military parade in Stalin Square, Budapest, 
circa 1956. Several tightly-packed military battalions are lined up in front of a large 
monument. Party and state officials stand on a plinth at the base of a towering figure 
labeled, in Hungarian, “SZTALIN.”  Lower still is the regular grid of military men at 
attention. Several boxy spectator tribunes reinforce the framing of the arrangement. 
In Tufte’s version of the photograph, Stalin’s statue speaks through a comic-book-like 
word bubble. “Next slide,” he says. The troops respond in similar fashion: “There’s NO 
bullet list, like Stalin’s bullet list!” and “The rate of information transfer is asymptoti-
cally approaching zero!” In other words: bureaucracy and thin data.
We can now cautiously conclude with the second, and much more speculative thesis 
implicit in Tuftean literature, namely the hint of a congruence between structures that 
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between the two grids: a parade and a bullet list? Emptied of content, the figure on the 
ground (a parade) and the figure on paper (a bullet list) are superficially similar. But 
is there more to it? Could we find in these shapes a theoretical framework capable of 
addressing systematic changes across a wide spectrum of ordering structures?
This may be a good time to pause to consider the traditional explanations for such 
seismic cultural shifts. The historiography I have used here departs from a certain 
tradition of writing about order as an artifact of a semiotic, representational system of 
organization. For Foucault (at least in his “archaeological” period), the history of the 
human sciences is unified by a common history of semiosis: the understanding of signs 
and their relationship to the world. In what perhaps is the most concise formulation of 
his project, Foucault writes: “Representation governs the mode of being of language, 
individuals, nature, and indeed itself.  The analysis of representation therefore, has 
a determining value of all the empirical domains.”22 We are then asked to imagine a 
hidden semiotic substratum which underlies all aspects of human activity.
As Foucault himself has acknowledged in the introduction to the English edition of 
The Order of Things, such an arrangement makes it difficult to account for simultane-
ous change in the surface phenomena. It is unclear who or what is capable of effecting 
change in the representational substratum. For Foucault, the invisible semiotic layer 
exists in the unconscious of all those biologists, linguists, and philosophers operating on 
its surface.23 Consequently, the mechanisms of historical cause and effect are entirely 
obscured. Foucault is therefore forced into the difficult position of describing broad 
social changes without having a coherent model of their influence or propagation.24
My brief response to the dilemma begins with an obvious observation. PowerPoint 
is a tool for making presentations, not representations. In contrast to Foucault’s hidden 
dynamics of semiosis, the artifacts of structured data design (or parade formations, 
for that matter) are figures visible on the surface of the organizing activity.25 Massive 
organizational structures are massively evident—that is their whole point. There might 
be other, more sinister and opaque facets of ideological control, but the shapes facing 
the public (parades and bullet points) transmit order explicitly, without mediation. To 
quote from the semiotics of Boris Uspensky, “It is necessary to acknowledge as primary 
the level of analysis which includes conventional devices that aid in the transmission 
of spatial and temporal relationships, and this without regard for the specificity of 
depicted objects.”26 Order, in the case of data tables or military battalions emptied of 
their content, is just that type of an explicit, spatial relationship between constituent 
elements. Tables and bullet points are therefore visible and non-representational by 
definition. Unlike words or pictures (which mean something else) they do not stand for 
anything. Cells, rows, columns, and tables are things in their own right. They can hold 
humans, numbers, or words. They morph and evolve to have histories and genealogies 
of their own and they must be studied in their own right, as superstratum.
The historian Michael Gordin hints at similar hypothesis about the unity of ordering 
structures. Describing  Dmitri Mendeleev’s 1892 metric reform at the Chief Bureau 
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measures; they were also supposed to standardize people, both the verifiers and the 
verified [...] Training in St. Petersburg standardized the inspectors, followed by their 
distribution to all the corners of the Empire.”27 And then again, it seems appropriate 
to quote Joseph Brodsky writing about a later period of Soviet history: “In a central-
ized state all rooms look alike: the office of my school’s principal was an exact replica 
of the interrogation chambers I began to frequent some five years later [...] and those 
stuccoed walls of my classrooms, with their blue horizontal stripe at eye level, [ran] 
unfailingly across the whole country, like the line of an infinite common denominator.”28
Much remains to be said about such lines, of best fit and for bread, database and 
tank columns, table cells and the cells of a prison. But even a small theoretical shift 
towards presentation enables the discovery a vast and largely unexplored documentary 
archive. It makes possible a history capable of observing broad social change, across 
multiple domains of human activity. In the case of the Soviet Union in the interwar 
period, attention to data design helps discern a major visual shift, in a variety of media, 
and to witness the development of a centralized organizational aesthetic that continues 
to shape people and information.
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be […] the best way to move past the impasses created by [...] an excessive emphasis on ideological 
demystification” (Best and Marcus, 18).
26. The Russian reads: “Самым общим—и, очевидно, наиболее важным—уровнем анализа 
следует признать уровень, рассматривающий условные приемы передачи пространственных и 
временных отношений в живописном произведении независимо от специфики изображаемых 
объектов” (Uspensky, 232). Translation by the author.
27. Gordin, 169. 
28. Brodsky, 11. 
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